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Macroeconomics without the LM: A Post Keynesian Perspective 
 
Abstract 
 Romer (2000) provides an alternative model to the AS/AD and IS/LM models that 
abandons the LM schedule by having the short-term interest rate set by the central bank. 
His framework acknowledges the critical role of the central bank in determining short-
term interest rates, which moves mainstream macroeconomics closer to Post Keynesian 
monetary theory.  
 The current paper presents a Post Keynesian construction of macroeconomics 
without an LM schedule. Rather than describing the financial sector in terms of an 
exogenously determined interest rate set by the central bank, the model unpacks financial 
markets by fully specifying a banking sector. The key analytic feature of the Post 
Keynesian approach is to replace the money market with the loan market. That makes 
transparent the macroeconomic significance of the loan market and bank behavior, and 
generates an endogenous money supply driven by bank lending. If banks become more 
optimistic over the cycle and lower their interest rate mark-up, that increases the 
likelihood of instability. 
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I Introduction 
 Romer (2000) provides an alternative model to the AS/AD and IS/LM models that 
abandons the LM schedule and recognizes that the short-term interest rate is set by 
central banks. Such a framework acknowledges the critical role of the central bank in 
determining short-term interest rates, moving mainstream macroeconomics closer to Post 
Keynesian monetary theory. However, Romer’s framework leaves the role of the 
financial sector and bank lending invisible, and these are features Post Keynesians have 
long argued are central to monetary macroeconomics.  
 The current paper presents an alternative Post Keynesian construction of 
macroeconomics without an LM schedule, the key analytic feature of which is to replace 
the money market with the loan market. This sharply distinguishes the Post Keynesian 
approach from the neo-Keynesian ISLM approach. It is not an exogenous interest rate 
that is the defining difference: it is the role of banks and bank lending. 
 The model makes transparently clear the macroeconomic significance of the loan 
market and bank behavior, and has an endogenous money supply that is driven by bank 
lending. If banks become more optimistic over the cycle and lower their interest rate 
mark-up, that increases the likelihood of instability. 
 A second difference from Romer is that rather than having a natural level of 
output and a vertical Phillips curve, the model allows equilibrium output to vary and 
there is an inflation – output trade-off. That makes the model explicitly Keynesian. 
 Finally, like Romer, the model is a closed economy model. That constitutes the 
starting point, and expanding it to an open economy context to take account of 
globalization is a future step. However, whether there are significant novel theoretical (as 
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opposed to policy) implications from globalization for Post Keynesian macroeconomics 
remains unclear and awaits further theoretical articulation.  
II The basic model 
 One challenge in analyzing the financial sector and monetary policy is to avoid 
conflating financial sector issues with real sector issues. The economy consists of a 
financial and real sector, and they interact as shown in Figure 1. Thus, price and quantity 
developments in the financial sector affect outcomes in the real sector, and vice-versa. 
This interaction makes it important to distinguish effects caused by the specification of 
the financial sector from effects due to the specification of the real sector.  
 The focus of the current paper is on the operation of the financial sector, and to 
avoid conflating financial and real sector effects the paper adopts a simple textbook 
Keynesian description of the real sector. In particular, this means excluding income 
distribution effects arising from changes in worker bargaining power, which have been a 
major focus of Post Keynesian research regarding the real sector.  
 The basic model consists of a goods market and a financial sector. The goods 
market is governed by a standard Keynesian closure in which output adjusts to equal 
aggregate demand, as follows:  
(1) y = E 
(2) E = E(y, iL, B, L-1, D-1, A1, A2, . )   Ey > 0, EiL< 0, EB > 0, EL< 0, ED> 0,  
                                                              EA1 > 0, EA2 > 0 
Where y = output, E = aggregate demand (AD), iL = loan interest rate, B = new 
borrowing, L-1 = last period’s stock of debt, D-1 = last period’s stock of bank deposits, A1 
= pure shock to animal spirits, and A2 = joint shock to animal spirits and liquidity 
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preference. For the time being the assumption is that inflation is zero. Income, borrowing, 
and the stock of debt are in real terms and are deflated by the price level (which can be 
thought of as normalized at unity). The assumed signs of the partial derivatives of the 
arguments of the AD function are as indicated.  
 Equation (1) is the goods market clearing condition, while equation (2) specifies 
the AD function. The level of AD depends positively on the flow of new borrowing. New 
borrowing finances spending: loan repayments lower spending. New borrowing adds to 
outstanding debt, which has a negative impact on next period spending. However, new 
borrowing also creates bank deposits through the lending activities of banks, and that 
adds to wealth and increases AD.  
 The financial sector is described by the following set of equations 
 (3) B = L – L-1 
(4) L = L(iL, y, A1, A2)                                   LiL < 0,  Ly >  0, LA1 >  0, LA2 > 0  
(5) iL = iF + m(A3, A4, … )                             iF > 0,m(.) > 0, mA3 > 0, mA4 > 0  
(6) A3 = αA2                                                                             α < 0  
Where L = loan demand, iL = bank loan market interest rate, iF = money market interest 
rate, m = interest rate spread between money market rate and loan rate, A3 = joint animal 
spirits – liquidity preference shock, and A4 = pure financial sector liquidity preference 
shock. 
 Equation (3) defines new borrowing. Equation (4) specifies loan demand, which 
depends negatively on the loan interest rate and positively on the level of income. The 
two animal spirits shocks positively impact loan demand. Equation (5) determines the 
market interest rate in terms of a spread over the money market rate. It can be thought of 
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as the bank mark-up, and this spread depends on the liquidity preference of financial 
institutions. This liquidity preference captures the state of financial market confidence 
and assessments of risk. The money market interest rate is exogenously set by the central 
bank. Equation (6) specifies the joint liquidity preference – animal spirits shock. 
 There are three types of shock. A1 is a pure “animal spirits” goods market shock 
that only affects spending. Its impact is positive. A4 is a pure financial sector liquidity 
preference shock that only affects credit market spreads. Its impact is to raise the spread. 
 A2 and A3 are joint animal spirits – liquidity preference shocks that affect both the 
goods market and the financial sector. The animal spirits shock raises confidence and AD 
and it simultaneously reduces liquidity preference (i.e. increases the confidence of 
banks), which lowers interest spreads. This pattern is a structural co-movement and not 
statistical covariance, and it reflects how changes in confidence that affect real spending 
can be mirrored in financial sector behavior.  
 The structural connection between liquidity preference and animal spirits has been 
emphasized by Kregel (1984/5) who sees them as two sides of the same coin. There is 
also a parallel with Davidson’s (1965) treatment of Keynes’ finance motive as increases 
in animal spirits increase the finance demand for money. Consequently, positive shocks 
to effective demand are structurally linked to positive shocks in the financial sector. The 
neo-Keynesian ISLM model’s failure to capture these structural connections and its 
representation of them as statistical co-variances was a major failing of the model.  
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 Figure 2 illustrates the determination of the short run level of output. Combining 
equations (1) and (2) yields the familiar IS schedule.1 The financial sector, represented by 
equation (5), determines the loan rate. The loan rate then affects the level of AD, thereby 
influencing the level of output.  
The comparative statics of the basic model are given by 
dy/diF < 0            diL/diF > 0 
dy/dA1> 0           diL/dA1= 0 
dy/dA2 > 0          diL/dA2 <  0   
dy/dA4 < 0          diL/dA4 > 0 
Increases in the policy interest rate lower income and raise the loan rate. Pure animal 
spirits shocks (A1) raise income and have no affect on the loan rate. Pure liquidity 
preference shocks (A4) raise the interest rate and lower income. Joint animal spirits - 
liquidity preference shocks (A2) raise income and lower rates, a pattern that is hard to 
generate and explain within the conventional neo-Keynesian ISLM model. This 
illustrates the importance of such shocks. 
III Endogenizing bank mark-ups and credit spreads 
 In the previous section the bank mark-up/credit spread was unaffected by the level 
of economic activity and lending. However, bank mark-ups may respond endogenously 
to real and financial sector developments. In this case the loan rate can be re-specified as 
(5’) iL = iF + m(L(iL, y, A1, A2), y, A3, A4, …)                      mL > 0, mY < 0 
 
1 For most Post Keynesians the major failing of the ISLM model is its treatment of the financial sector in 
terms of an LM schedule that lacks reference to bank lending and endogenous money. A smaller group of 
Post Keynesians associated with the Cambridge U.K. school also question the IS schedule, believing it may 
be upward sloping due to capital re-switching effects. However, empirical estimates of aggregate effective 
demand find a negative relation with real interest rates, and that is the assumption built into equation (2). 
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Equation (5’) has the credit spread responding positively to the level of lending and 
negatively to the level of income. 
 The positive response to lending is consistent with both the structuralist (Palley, 
1987/88; Pollin, 1991) and horizontalist (Wray, 1991; Lavoie, 1996) views of 
endogenous money. According to structuralists, credit markets can become congested 
owing to financing limitations of individual firms and limited portfolio demands on part 
of banks and others to hold loans. According to horizontalists, spreads may also increase 
due to the worsening credit quality of marginal borrowers as the loan pool grows – an 
argument that is also supported by structuralists. 
 The interest rate spread or mark-up can also fall in response to expansions of 
income. This reflects a Minskyian psychological channel whereby economic expansions 
improve the “confidence” of lenders and investors, leading them to lower required risk 
premiums. Such an outcome might be associated with the transition from hedge to 
speculative finance (Minsky, 1975, 1986). 
 The reduced form of equation (5’) yields a mark-up given by 
(5”) iL = iF + m(y, A1, A2, A3, A4)    mY >< 0 
The interesting and novel feature is that the bank mark-up may therefore rise or fall with 
income. It rises if the loan volume effect dominates and falls if the Minskyian confidence 
effect dominates. The loan volume effect refers to the impact of credit market congestion 
and/or deteriorating borrower quality.  
 The bank loan rate schedule given by equation (5”) constitutes an effective loan 
supply schedule as it determines the terms on which credit is made available. In a Post 
Keynesian monetary framework loan demand and the bank loan rate schedule are the 
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critical determinants of interest rates. This contrasts with the neo-Keynesian ISLM model 
that emphasizes the role of money supply and money demand. From a Post Keynesian 
perspective the LM schedule (liquidity – money) is replaced by an LL schedule (liquidity 
– loans).  
 Figures 3.a, 3.b, and 3.c show three different LL schedules derived under different 
assumptions about the behavior of bank mark-ups and credit spreads. Figure 3.a assumes 
that credit spreads are exogenously fixed, generating a horizontal LL schedule. Figure 3.b 
assumes that credit spreads rise with income, generating a positively sloped LL schedule. 
Figure 3.c assumes that credit spreads fall with increases in income, generating a 
negatively sloped LL schedule.  
 The short run equilibrium level of output is then determined by combining the IS 
and LL schedules, which are given respectively by 
(6.a) y = E(iL, L-1, D-1, A1, A2) 
(6.b) iL = iF + m(y, A1, αA2, A4) 
Graphically, the short run equilibrium output and interest rate are determined by the 
intersection of the IS and LL schedules drawn in loan rate – output space. Figure 4 shows 
the determination of equilibrium for the case where the IS schedule is negatively sloped 
and the LL schedule is positively sloped. 
 If the Minskyian confidence effect on the loan mark-up dominates the loan 
volume effect, the LL schedule is negatively sloped. If the LL schedule is more 
negatively sloped than the IS schedule, it is easy to intuit that the economy might be 
unstable. This is because increases in AD cause expansions in income that in turn raise 
financial market confidence, which lowers the loan interest rate. That in turn causes a 
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further expansion in AD and output. This pattern fits with Minsky’s (1992) description of 
his financial instability hypothesis.  
IV Monetary aggregates in the Post Keynesian model 
 Whereas the ISLM model has the money supply determined by the money 
multiplier, Post Keynesian endogenous money theory emphasizes the loan multiplier 
(Coghlan, 1978). This reflects a reversal of causation whereby it is loans that create 
deposits rather than deposits creating loans. 
 The operation of the loan multiplier and the determination of the money supply 
can be described by adding the following equations describing the banking sector. 
(7) L +R = D 
(8) R = kD                                   0 < k < 1 
(9) L = L(iL, y, ..) 
(10) D = D(iD, y, q)                     DiD > 0, Dy > 0, Dq > 0 
(11) iF =[1 + k]βiD                      β > 1 
Where R = required reserves, D = demand deposits, k = required reserve ratio for 
deposits, q = equity prices, and iD = interest rate on deposits.  
 Equation (7) is the banking sector’s balance sheet constraint. Equation (8) 
determines required reserve holdings. Equation (9) is the aggregate loan demand 
function. Equation (10) is the demand for bank deposits (i.e. money demand). It is a 
positive function of the deposit interest rate and income. It is also a positive function of 
stock prices, reflecting that when stock prices are higher stock dividend yields are lower, 
making bank deposits relatively more attractive. Finally, equation (11) links the deposit 
rate to the money market rate. Deposits and money market borrowing are both sources of 
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funds to individual banks, and they therefore equalize the marginal costs of these funding 
sources (Palley, 1987/88). The cost of deposits includes the reserve requirement that must 
be held on each dollar of deposits (k) plus administrative costs (β). Hence the true cost of 
deposits is the interest rate (iD) scaled up to incorporate reserve requirement and 
administration costs. 
 Combining equations (7) and (8) and rearranging yields  
(12) L = [1-k]D  
Where [1-k] is the loan multiplier. Loans create deposits that are then loaned out by 
banks. The amount that can be re-loaned depends on the reserve requirement ratio that 
determines how much of each deposit the banks must retain. A higher reserve 
requirement ratio (k) therefore lowers the multiplier as banks must hold on to more of 
each deposit.  
First differencing equation (12) provides the relation between loan creation, new 
borrowing, and deposit creation, which is as follows 
(13) L – L-1= B = [1-k][D – D-1] 
 Figure 4 shows the determination of the money supply and stock prices for a 
given level of income. The northeast quadrant describes the loan market in which banks 
satisfy all loan demand at the loan interest rate that is a mark-up over the money market 
rate. The southeast panel shows the loan multiplier, and it determines the money supply. 
 The northwest panel constitutes the money market, which works as follows. The 
banking system determines the money supply via the volume of lending, and the money 
(deposits) that is created must be willingly held (Goodhart, 1989; Palley, 1991; Howells, 
1995). Money demand is therefore brought into alignment with money supply through 
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equity price adjustment. If agents have excess money balances, they buy equities. This 
drives up equity prices until they are content to hold the existing stock of deposits. This 
equilibrating process results in a positive relationship between the money supply and 
equity prices. Thus, increases in bank lending that increase the money supply (stock of 
deposits) generate an increase in equity prices. 
 Note, as currently specified, the money market, money demand and equity prices 
are separable from rest of model, given by the IS and LL equations that summarize the 
real sector and the banking sector. This simplifies presentation of the model by keeping it 
to a two dimensional space. However, if equity prices are added as arguments of the AD 
and loan demand functions, the model becomes a simultaneous Post Keynesian short run 
general equilibrium model determining outcomes in the goods market, the loan market, 
and the money market.2 That makes it difficult to represent graphically as there are three 
endogenous variables: income (y), the loan rate (iL), and stock prices (q).  
 Analytically, the significance of making AD depend positively on stock prices is 
to make the effects of endogenous money more expansionary. This is because increased 
lending expands the money supply, causing stock prices to rise, which in turn further 
increases AD and output. 
V Adding inflation 
 Inflation is an important part of the economic environment, and the model can be 
expanded to include its effects. Introducing inflation introduces a distinction between 
nominal and real interest rates. The financial sector determines the nominal interest rate 
 
2 The rationale for AD depending on equity prices would be a stock market wealth effect, which would 
make AD a positive function of q. The rationale for loan demand depending on equity prices is that firms 
might shift to equity financing when equity prices are high and the cost of equity capital low, thereby 
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while goods market decisions depend on the real rate. 
 This pattern can be captured by adding an equation for the real interest rate and 
re-specifying AD as follows 
(2’) E = E(y, rL, π, B, L-1, D-1, A1, A2, … )              Eπ > 0 
(14) rL = iL – π 
where rL = real interest rate and π = inflation rate. Inflation has two expansionary effects 
on AD. First, it lowers the real interest rate via equation (14). Second, it causes agents to 
bring forward spending plans in anticipation of higher prices, which raises AD via 
equation (2’). 
Figure 5 shows the basic model of the goods market amended to include the effect 
of inflation. There are now two interest rates – the nominal and the real – to be 
determined, along with the level of output. Banks set a nominal interest rate that is a 
mark-up over the nominal money market rate that is set by the monetary authority. Given 
the rate of inflation, this bank nominal loan rate then determines a real interest rate that 
determines AD, which in turn determines output in the goods market.  
 The money market and stock market will also be affected by inflation because 
inflation affects money demand. This can be captured by re-specifying the demand for 
deposits to include inflation as an argument, as follows:  
(10’) D = D(iD, π. y, q)          DiD > 0, Dπ < 0. Dy > 0, Dq > 0  
According to this specification inflation reduces the demand for deposits as it is akin to a 
tax on money. Holders of deposits therefore try to switch out of them by buying equity, 
which drives up equity prices. However, the stock of deposits is determined by bank 
making loan demand a negative function of q. 
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lending so that trying to switch out of deposits by buying equity does not reduce the 
money supply. Instead, equity prices must increase so that the dividend yield falls until 
agents are willing to hold the money balances created by the banking system’s lending 
activity. 
VI Adding monetary policy 
 Monetary policy operates through the money market rate that the central bank 
controls. In the U.S. this rate is the federal funds rate. Policy can be conceptualized as the 
monetary authority setting a nominal money market interest rate with the goal of hitting 
output target, y*. This implies a target money market rate of  
(15) iF* = E-1(y*, m(L(.), y, A3, A4, ) - π, B, L-1, D-1, A1, A2,… ) 
The economic logic behind the target selection rests on the monetary authority working 
backward from its output target to an interest rate setting consistent with hitting that 
target.  
 Thus, a given output target implies a needed level of AD. Given the parameters of 
AD that implies a needed real loan rate. Given the inflation rate, that implies a needed 
nominal loan rate. Given the parameters of the banking sector’s mark-up, that nominal 
loan rate implies a needed nominal money market rate, which is the target interest rate. 
 The target money market rate is a negative function of the output target (y*), a 
negative function of banks’ mark-up (m), and a positive function of inflation (π). It is also 
a positive function of factors that increase AD, and a negative function of factors that 
decrease AD. 
VII Endogenizing inflation 
  So far inflation has been taken as given. However, inflation can be endogenized 
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by adding a Phillips curve, which can be either a demand-pull or a conflict inflation 
Phillips curve.  
 A simple linear version of the Phillips curve is given by 
(15) π = a0 + a1y 
Equation (15) implies that inflation is a positive function of the level of output. A 
straightforward implication of such a Phillips curve is that targeting the level of output is 
equivalent to targeting a particular rate of inflation.  
 Given the above Phillips curve, the nominal interest rate target becomes 
(15’) iF* = E-1(y*, m(L(.), y, A3, A4, ) - π, B, L-1, D-1, A1, A2,… )  
             = E-1(y*, m(L(.), y, A3, A4, ) - a0 - a1y*, B, L-1, D-1, A1, A2,… ) 
where y*= the target output level. Alternatively, the target interest rate can be expressed 
in terms of a target inflation rate as follows 
(15”) iF* = E-1(y, m(L(.), y, A3, A4, ) – π*, B, L-1, D-1, A1, A2,… )  
             = E-1([π* - a0]/a1, m(L(.), y, A3, A4, ) - π*, B, L-1, D-1, A1, A2,… ) 
where π* = a0 + a1y*. Endogenizing inflation therefore results in a nominal interest rate 
policy rule that can be expressed as a function of either an output target or an inflation 
target.  
 From a Post Keynesian perspective inflation targeting is equivalent to output 
targeting. The problem is that inflation targeting obscures that reality, and by obscuring 
that reality can result in sub-optimal policy choices. Thus, because inflation is a bad, 
policy makers may lean toward a sub-optimally low inflation target with significant 
output losses if they are unaware of the fact that an inflation target is also implicitly an 
output target. That is why inflation targeting is an undesirable public policy frame 
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(Palley, 2007). 
 The interest rate policy functions given by equations (15’) and (15”) can be 
represented in both output – interest rate space and inflation - interest rate space, and the 
reaction functions trace out the nominal money market interest rate required to hit a target 
level of output or inflation. The nominal money market interest rate then implies a 
nominal loan market rate and a real interest rate.  
 These interest rate functions are conditional on the state of AD and the Phillips 
curve, and changes in variables affecting AD or the parameters of the Phillips curve shift 
these functions. For instance, an increase in goods market animal spirits (A1) will shift 
the interest rate functions up. The economic logic is that the higher animal spirits increase 
AD, calling for a lower target interest rate to hit any level of output.  
 An increase in bank liquidity preference (A4) will shift the interest rate functions 
down. The logic is that increased bank liquidity preference raises credit market spreads 
and the market real interest rate. To hit a given output target policy must therefore lower 
the real rate, which calls for a downward shift of the nominal interest rate policy function. 
 Lastly, an adverse shift in the Phillips curve will shift up the nominal interest rate 
policy function. The logic is that each output level is now associated with a higher rate of 
inflation.  To maintain the real interest rate consistent with any given output target, the 
nominal policy rate must rise. Consequently the policy interest rate function shifts up 
along its entirety. 
 The slope of the nominal interest rate policy function is ambiguous, and it can be 
positively or negatively sloped with respect to output. This ambiguity is because the 
required nominal interest rate is subject to conflicting forces. On one hand, an increase in 
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the output target needs a lower real interest rate that calls for a lower nominal rate. On the 
other hand, an increase in the output target raises inflation which calls for a higher 
nominal rate to prevent excessive reduction in the real rate. 
 There are three factors affecting the slope of the policy interest rate function: 1) 
the interest sensitivity of AD; 2) the slope of the Phillips curve; and 3) the behavior of the 
bank mark-up. 
 The policy interest rate function will tend to be positively sloped in output – 
interest rate space if 1) AD is sensitive to the real interest rate, 2) the Phillips curve is 
steep so that inflation rises rapidly with output, and 3) the credit spread is insensitive to 
output or even narrows with output. In this case, the central bank will need to raise 
nominal interest rates with output to stop the real rate from falling too far. 
 The nominal interest rate policy function will tend to be negatively sloped in 
output – interest rate space if 1) AD is in sensitive to the real interest rate, 2) the Phillips 
curve is relatively flat, and 3) the credit spread is increases with output. In this case, the 
central bank will need to lower nominal interest rates with output in order to lower the 
real rate and sustain a level of AD consistent with a higher output target. 
 The slope of the nominal interest rate policy function can give rise to interesting 
dynamics of interest rate adjustment when the monetary authority changes its output 
target. Thus, suppose the authority raises its output target, and therefore lowers its 
nominal policy rate to stimulate demand. Given the initial inflation rate, this lowers the 
real interest rate, causing output and inflation to increase. As inflation increases, the 
monetary authority may then need to start raising the nominal rate to achieve the real rate 
consistent with the new output target.  
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VII Stability analysis  
  Thus far the analysis has focused on static equilibrium outcomes and comparative 
static effects. The appendix provides a simple linear version of the model with a 
Keynesian dynamic adjustment equation of the form  
(16) Δy = ψ[E-1 – y-1]                                   0 <  ψ < 1 
According to this adjustment mechanism output responds to last period’s excess demand 
conditions, partially closing the gap in the current period. If ψ is large, then the output 
response to excess demand is large: if ψ is small, the reverse holds. 
 Given such an adjustment mechanism the linear system of equations reduces to a 
second order difference equation in output. As is well known, such an equation can 
generate convergent (stable) or divergent (unstable) outcomes, and the current model fits 
this pattern. 
   However, it is worth considering the case where (a) the Minsky confidence effect 
dominates the loan congestion effect (my < 0) so that the loan rate mark-up falls as output 
expands; (b) new borrowing has a large positive impact on AD (EB is large); and (c) the 
absolute value of the AD wealth effect of bank deposits and bank loans is the same (|EL| = 
|ED|). In this event one of the necessary stability conditions may be violated so that the 
model is unstable.  
 The economic logic is simple. New borrowing strongly expands AD and output, 
causing the loan rate mark-up and the loan rate to fall, in turn generating further 
expansion of AD and output. Such a process is the hallmark of a Minskyian business 
cycle. 
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 Lastly, if AD is strongly sensitive to inflation (Eπ is large) this also increases the 
likelihood of instability. That is because of the Tobin –Mundell effect (Tobin 1965, 1975) 
whereby inflation causes agents to shift away from money and increase spending, thereby 
further increasing AD and inflation. 
VIII Conclusion 
 This paper has presented a macro model of economy that incorporates a Post 
Keynesian construction of the financial sector. The key analytic feature of the model that 
distinguishes it from the neo-Keynesian ISLM model is replacement of the money market 
with the loan market. The model makes transparently clear the macroeconomic 
significance of the loan market and bank behavior, and has an endogenous money supply 
that is driven by bank lending. If banks become more optimistic over the cycle and lower 
their mark-up, that increases the likelihood of instability. 
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Appendix 
This appendix explores the dynamic stability properties of a linear version of the model 
developed in the main body of the paper. The linear model is given by the following 
equations: 
(A.1) Δy = ψ[E-1 – y-1]                                      0 < ψ <1 
(A.2) E = ε0 + ε1y +  ε2[iL – π] + ε3π + ε4B + ε5L-1 + ε6D-1        ε0, ε1, ε3, ε4, ε6 > 0; ε2, ε5, < 0 
(A.3) π = ρ0 + ρ1y                                             ρ0, ρ1 > 0   
(A.4) iL = iF + m 
(A.5) m = m0 + m1y                                          m0 > 0,  m1 >< 0 
(A.6) B = L - L-1 
(A.7) L = λ0 + λ1iL + λ2y                                  λ0 , λ2 > 0; λ1< 0 
(A.8) D = δ0 + δ1iD + δ2q + δ3y                        δ0, δ1, δ3 > 0;  δ2 < 0 
(A.9) iD = iF/[1 + k]β                                        k, β > 0 
(A.10) L = [1 – k]D 
Equation (A.1) describes the output adjustment process, which is driven by a Keynesian 
excess demand mechanism. As discussed in the text, the equilibrium version of the model 
can be reduced to a two equation system consisting of an IS (goods market equilibrium) 
and LL (loan market equilibrium schedule). 
Equation (A.1) – (A.3) describe the real economy and include the Phillips curve. 
Equations (A.4) – (A.10) describe the financial sector, including the banking sector.  
The dynamics of the model have the loan and stock markets always being in equilibrium, 
but the goods market can be out of equilibrium and marked by excess demand. In effect, 
the dynamics of the model have desired borrowing equal to actual borrowing and desired 
portfolio holdings equal to actual portfolio holdings, but there can be excess demand in 
goods markets. That excess demand drives future output adjustment. 
Equations (A.3) – (A.10) can be used to solve the current values of iL, iD, and q. These 
are given respectively by: 
(A.11) iL = iF + m0 + m1y 
(A.12) iD = iF/[1 + k]β = ziF                          z = 1/[1 + k]β 
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(A.13) q = {λ0 + λ1m0 - [1 – k]δ0 + [λ1 - [1 – k]δ1z]iF + [λ1m1 + λ2 - [1 – k]δ3]y}/[1 – k]δ2 
Substituting equations (A.11) – (A.13) into equations (A.7) and (A.8) yields 
(A.14) L = λ0 + λ1[m0+ iF] + [λ1m1+ λ2]y                             
(A.15) D = [λ0 + λ1m0]/[1-k] + λ1iF/[1-k] + [λ1m1 + λ2]y/[1-k] 
Substituting (A.3), (A.6), (A.14), and (A.15), into equation (A.2) yields 
(A.16) E = ε0 + ε2[iF + m0 – ρ0] + ε3ρ0 + ε5[λ0 + λ1[m0+ iF]] + ε6[λ0 + λ1m0 + λ1iF]/[1-k] 
+ {ε1 + ε2[m1 - ρ1] + ε3ρ1 + ε4[λ1m1+ λ2]}y - {ε4 - ε5 - ε6}[λ1m1+ λ2]y-1 
Lagging equation (A.16) yields 
(A.17) E-1 = ε0 + ε2[iF + m0 – ρ0] + ε3ρ0 + ε5[λ0 + λ1[m0+ iF]] + ε6[λ0 + λ1m0 + λ1iF]/[1-k] 
+ {ε1 + ε2[m1 - ρ1] + ε3ρ1 + ε4[λ1m1+ λ2]}y-1 - {ε4 - ε5 - ε6}[λ1m1+ λ2]y-2 
Rearranging equation (A.1) yields 
(A.1’) y = [1 -ψ]y-1 + ψ E-1 
Substituting equation (A.17) into (A.1’) yields 
(A.19) y = ψ{ε0 + ε2[iF + m0–ρ0] + ε3ρ0 + ε5[λ0 + λ1[m0+ iF]] + ε6[λ0 + λ1m0 + λ1iF]/[1-k]} 
       + [1- ψ + ψ{ε1 + ε2[m1 - ρ1] + ε3ρ1 + ε4[λ1m1+ λ2]}]y-1  
- ψ{ε4 - ε5 - ε6}[λ1m1+ λ2]y-2 
Equation (A.19) can then be re-written as 
(A.20) y = a0 + a1y-1+ a2y-2 
where a0 = ψ{ε0 + ε2[iF+m0–ρ0] + ε3ρ0 + ε5[λ0+λ1[m0+ iF]] + ε6[λ0+λ1m0 + λ1iF]/[1-k]} 
           a1 = 1- ψ + ψ{ε1 + ε2[m1 - ρ1] + ε3ρ1 + ε4[λ1m1+ λ2]} 
           a2 = - ψ{ε4 - ε5 - ε6}[λ1m1+ λ2] 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for stability (Gandolfo, 1985, p.59) are 
1 + a1 + a2 > 0 
1 - a2 > 0 
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1 - a1 + a2 > 0 
Inspection of the stability condition reveals that the model can be stable or unstable, 
depending on the parameter values. However, it is worth considering the case where 
m1 < 0, ε4 is large, and |ε5| = |ε6|.  
m1 < 0 implies the Minsky confidence effect dominates the loan congestion effect, so 
that the loan rate mark-up falls as output expands. ε4 is large says that new borrowing 
has a large positive impact on AD. |ε5| = |ε6| implies the absolute value of the AD 
wealth effect of bank deposits and bank loons is the same. 
These signings unambiguously imply a1 > 0 and a2 < 0. In this case if |a1| and |a2| are 
both large, the stability condition 1 - a1 + a2 > 0 may be violated so that the model is 
unstable.  
The economic logic is simple. New borrowing strongly expands AD and output, 
causing the loan rate mark-up and the loan rate to fall, in turn generating further 
expansion of AD and output. Such a process is the hallmark of a Minskyian business 
cycle. 
Lastly, if AD is strongly sensitive to inflation (ε3 large) this also increases the 
likelihood of instability by increasing the absolute value of a1. This is because of the 
Tobin –Mundell effect whereby inflation causes agents to shift away from money and 
increase spending, thereby further increasing AD and inflation.  
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Figure 3.a. Horizontal LL (y0 < y1)
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 Figure 3.b. Positively sloped LL 
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 Figure 3.c. Negatively sloped LL 
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 Figure 4: Determination of the money supply and stock prices 
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